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The sexual exploitation of children remains a very serious problem and is rapidly 
increasing globally through the use of the Internet. This work focuses on the current 
methods employed by criminals to generate and distribute child pornography, the 
methods used by law enforcement agencies to deter them, and the drawbacks of currently 
used methods, as well as the surrounding legal and privacy issues. A proven method to 
detect the transmission of illicit images at the network layer is presented within this 
paper. With this research, it is now possible to actively filter illicit pornographic images 
as they are transmitted over the network layer in real-time. It is shown that a Stochastic 
Learning Weak Estimator learning algorithm and a Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
learning algorithm can be applied against Linear Classifiers to identify and filter illicit 
pornographic images. In this thesis, these two learning algorithms were combined with 
algorithms such as the Non-negative Vector Similarity Coefficient-based Distance 
algorithm, Euclidian Distance, and Weighted Euclidian Distance. Based upon this 
research, a prototype was developed using the abovementioned system, capable of 
performing classification on both compressed and uncompressed images. Experimental 
results showed that classification accuracies and the overhead of network-based 
approaches did have a significant effect on routing devices. All images used in our 
experiments were legal. No actual child pornography images were ever collected, seen, 
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Historically, prior to the invention and advent of affordable consumer computing 
equipment, documentation of the sexual exploitation of children was done mainly 
through two mediums: chemical film-based motion video or chemical film-based still 
frame photography, both of which were often costly to develop and difficult to distribute. 
As it is done today, these produced materials were then relinquished for monetary 
exchange or equal barter to a vast array of interested parties, thus further promoting child 
abuse and exploitation, and eventually creating an entire industry. This problem 
continues to grow rapidly, and a single instance to reflect the severity of this problem is 
shown from a February 2006 report by the Danish National IT and Telecom Agency. It 
states that of the 2,000 web addresses blacklisted for containing child pornography by 
Danish Internet Service Providers, an average of 36,000 daily attempts were made by 
Internet users to access those very same sites [1]. Table 1-1 illustrates some Internet 
pornography statistics for 2006. 
 
The sexual abuse of children has long been a dark and disturbing facet of human history 
dating back many centuries, an issue which is large and complex, and drastically escapes 
the scope of this thesis. The purpose of this thesis is to primarily focus on the current 
problem: the electronic distribution of images which portray the illegal sexual 
interference of children. Current detection and prevention methodologies, legal aspects, 
privacy issues, and the details of an efficient technical implementation which facilitate 
the detection of illicit materials, transferred through data networks, are also discussed. 
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Internet Pornography Statistics 
Pornographic websites 4.2 million (12% of total websites) 
Pornographic pages 420 million 
Daily pornographic search engine 
requests 
68 million (25% of total search engine 
requests) 
Daily pornographic emails 2.5 billion (8% of total emails) 
Internet users who view porn 42.7% 
Received unwanted exposure to sexual 
material 
34% 
Average daily pornographic emails/user 4.5 per Internet user 
Monthly Pornographic downloads (Peer-
to-peer) 
1.5 billion (35% of all downloads) 
Daily Gnutella "child pornography" 
requests 
116,000 
Websites offering illegal child 
pornography 
100,000 
Sexual solicitations of youth made in chat 
rooms 
89% 
Youths who received sexual solicitation 1 in 7 (down from 2003 stat of 1 in 3) 
Worldwide visitors to pornographic 
websites 
72 million visitors to pornography: Monthly 
Internet Pornography Sales $4.9 billion 
 
Table 1-1: Internet pornography statistics in year 2006.  (Table courtesy of 
http://internet-filter-review.toptenreviews.com/) 
 
The problem this thesis approaches is the electronic transmission of child pornography. 
In an attempt to accomplish this, our approach uses a Stochastic Learning Weak 
Estimator, and a Maximum Likelihood Estimator coupled with Linear Classifiers. Our 
experimental results showed that the Stochastic Weak Learning Estimator coupled with a 
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Non-negative vector similarity coefficient-based distance algorithm was best suited 
towards host-based environment since its accuracy proved to be better than any other 
method. A Maximum Likelihood Estimator coupled with a Variational Distance 
algorithm showed better results for network layer approaches as its performance was 
superior to any of the other methods this thesis explored. For this experiment, our results 
showed an overhead of 16% on our router. 
 
This thesis is organized into the following sections; Section 1 discusses the existing 
situation with regards to the demand, production and distribution of child images. This 
section also deals with law enforcement’s reaction, the various agency collaborations and 
the issue of privacy. Section 2 reviews related works which discuss the various image 
recognition algorithms, and other commercially available products. The main products 
currently available for this process are host-based, network-based, hardware-based and 
combination of these three. Section 3 discusses the design and implementation of the 
developed software through the various stages of this process. These design stages 
involve image extraction, image decoding, and image classification which are explained 
in detail. Section 4 discusses the simulation results obtained by testing the system under 
varying constraints. Section 5 concludes the thesis and discusses potential direction for 
future work.  
 
All images used in our experiments were legal. No actual child pornography images were 
ever collected, seen, sought, used or considered. 
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1.1 Current Situation 
The current situation involving child pornography extends beyond that of a few 
individuals acquiring and collecting such items for personal reasons, to that of a global 
underground market extensively driven by supply and demand. 
 
1.1.1 The Demand of the Market 
Currently, millions of images are being electronically transmitted from sellers to buyers, 
for currency or barter, each day over the Internet. This trade has significantly blossomed 
from a niche market targeting certain demographics, to a more generalized form which 
strives to reside within an already accepted adult pornography ecosystem. The global 
reach of the Internet has certainly been the key catalyst in facilitating this market shift 
and has made the trafficking of this media easier than ever. It has become much easier to 
produce, distribute and trade. Figure 1-1 and Table 1-2 illustrates the top pornographic 
revenues worldwide for 2006.    
 








South Korea* $25.73  $526.76  
Japan $19.98  $156.75  
Finland* $0.60  $114.70  
Australia $2.00  $98.70  
Brazil* $0.10  $53.17  
Czech Republic* $0.46  $44.94  
US $13.33  $44.67  
Taiwan $1.00  $43.41  
UK $1.97  $31.84  
Canada $1.00  $30.21  
China* $27.40  $27.41  
Italy $1.40  $24.08  
Netherlands $0.20  $12.13  
Philippines* $1.00  $11.18  
Germany $0.64  $7.77  
Russia* $0.25  $1.76  
 
Table 1-2: 2006 Worldwide Pornography Revenues in billions. (Table courtesy of 
http://internet-filter-review.toptenreviews.com/)  
* Incomplete 
1.1.2 The Production  
Practically, those who produce child pornography use readily available and affordable 
digital imaging equipment to record images of abuse. The intense competition among the 
various digital equipment manufacturers in recent years has yielded lower cost devices to 
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enter low to medium income homes and has revolutionized the photography market. 
Private chemical film development labs which require expertise, specialized equipment 
and considerable skill are no longer required to produce professional photographs; these 
digital devices have greatly simplified the production and distribution of photographic 
images. The declining cost of complex computing equipment is made possible by 
Moore’s Law, which factors the accelerating number of transistors in a particular unit 
against time. Figure 1-2 depicts a graphical representation of Moore’s Law. 
 
Figure 1- 2:  Moore's Law (Graphic courtesy of Intel Corporation 
http://download.intel.com/pressroom/kits/events/moores_law_40th/) 
 
When these images are created digitally, they require mass storage for a given amount of 
data. As of 2002, the average cost per gigabyte of magnetic storage was 850% less than 
the same in 1995 [2].
 
Digital photographs and digital video collections occupy 
tremendous amounts of space, of which the cost is reduced over time. This benefit for the 
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majority has led the minority of criminals having better assistance for their operations 
with nearly infinite storage capability, and giving further growth to their actions. 
Therefore, storage, which is part of the production process, has become a non-issue for 
the facilitation of child pornography. Figure 1-3 illustrates the cost of magnetic storage 
with a logarithmic plot against time. 
 
Figure 1- 3: Evolution of magnetic data storage (Graphic courtesy of 
http://www.singularity.com) 
 
1.1.3  The Distribution 
The distribution of these materials over the Internet has also become as simple as its 
production. Hundreds of peer-to-peer (P2P) services (LimeWire, Aries, Kazaa) are 
available to use free of charge and high speed Internet access has infiltrated nearly every 
industrious population worldwide [3]. These types of networks allow the free trade of 
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data between users, with specific content selected by the users themselves. A secondary 
back-end service catalogues and journals the content being shared, and then compiles this 
data within a central database to increase searchable targets and access. After an initial 
search is queried, users are directed to the results of that particular search string, these 
results often provide the preliminary doorway in establishing contact with those who 
distribute illicit sexual content. Figure 1-4 shows a screen capture of the LimeWire Peer-
to-Peer application. 
 
Figure 1- 4: Snapshot of LimeWire application 
 
Internet chat rooms are another avenue of social interaction and have facilitated 
interactive communications for many years [4]. Users using this type of service are able 
to interact in real time with others who share their interests. These interactions can be 
done through text messages, live audio or live video. An arrangement may then be made 
to trade materials, illicit or otherwise, through secondary methods after contact has been 
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established. In March of 2006, the United States Department of Justice arrested 27 
individuals engaged in the sexual molestation children using such chat rooms and 
interactive methods [5]. This example is one case in hundreds which have successfully 
been prosecuted, yet thousands still go unnoticed, mostly perhaps because of the 
limitations of current investigative techniques and technologies. 
 
Traditional hypertext based websites also pose a serious challenge for law enforcement 
agencies. Canadian authorities estimate that over 100,000 traditional websites which 
contain hundreds of thousands of sexual abuse images are currently in operation [6].
 
These websites often sell memberships to individuals on a time-limited basis, in which 
the user is free to browse and download the site’s content. This method of illicit material 
propagation remains the most simple and widely used profitable distribution mechanism, 
and seems to be rapidly escalating. 
 
In total, of the millions of child pornography images seized within Canada, only 50 
children have been identified by authorities as of 2003 [6]. This statistic once again 
emphasizes the technical boundaries and limited man power dedicated to the elimination 
of this disturbing and overwhelming problem. 
 
1.2 Law Enforcement’s Reaction, Operations and Activities 
Law enforcement agencies are continually challenged by the burden of painstakingly 
ascertaining, tracking, identifying, and capturing child pornographers. Due to the number 
of images being produced and distributed, and the limited man power available, it is 
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apparent that computerized assistance must be equated within the solution. Though 
difficult, there have been a limited number of arrests using sting operations and 
collaborative efforts amongst concerned agencies. 
 
1.2.1  Sting Operations 
Law enforcement agencies have resorted to operating fraudulent websites which 
showcase an assortment of supposed child abuse images. These websites can then ask for 
registration and also for credit card payments to activate membership. Once an identity is 
established, police investigate the individual further. In 2003, various Police agencies 
from Britain, North America and Australia successfully executed Operation Pin which 
involved the creation of fraudulent websites to attract pedophiles, and obtain the details 
of their identities [7]. 
 
Once these identities have been established, further investigations of the individuals are 
conducted. In January of 2001, The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 
commenced Operation Candyman by monitoring the electronic mail and chat room 
interactions of suspected pedophiles. Within several months, agents had assembled and 
identified a database of thousands of individuals who were then tracked to their homes 
and workplaces using IP addressing data obtained from service providers [8]. 
 
1.2.2 Agency Collaboration 
A large amount of resources are needed to conduct operations such as Pin and 
Candyman, and almost all are the result of intensive collaboration between law 
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enforcement agencies using integrated systems and extensive communications. One such 
effective system developed by Microsoft Corporation and the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, allows registered law enforcement agencies to gather and analyze identification 
information of suspected pedophiles using sophisticated data sharing systems. The Child 
Exploitation Tracking System, or CETS, was officially launched in April of 2005 [6]. 
Previously, information detailed and gathered was inaccessible to other agencies who 
may have been tracking the same individuals. This issue was certain to cause a lower 
arrest rate and entirely ineffective against the wide outreach of the Internet. With the 
implementation of CETS, agencies across the world can access and update a database of 
information pertaining to particular persons of interest who may be involved in the 
production or distribution of child pornography. At present, every law enforcement 
agency within Canada is utilizing CETS to assist with their investigations [6]. 
 
1.3  Privacy 
A vital and serious issue encompassing the detection and prevention of electronic child 
pornography transmissions remains the protection of privacy. As with any invasive 
method of analyzing data, the risk of abuse or inadvertent exposure is an element which 
must be addressed, and has been done so in this context in accordance with laws and 
regulations concerning the inspection of transient data. 
To collect, store and analyze any type of data transmitted over the Internet by end-users 
opens a discussion and debate into the legality of such a practice, and to be certain that 
such methods are performed transparently and legally, a look into previous cases 
involving similar circumstances helps to gain a better understanding of this dilemma. 
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In one such case, the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) implemented a Closed Circuit 
Television (CCTV) camera monitoring system into its transit system in 2004, in an effort 
to reduce crimes aboard civilian transport vehicles. This system operates by recording 
passengers as they enter or exit busses or subways, as well as for the duration of their 
journey, then, at one point, stored this data for up to 30 days for review if needed [9]. 
 
Privacy complaints against the TTC argued that no studies showed that such a video 
surveillance system would lead to a reduction in crime, and that such systems were 
plagued with technological faults which prevent their effectiveness. This complaint in 
particular was resolved when the TTC decided to erase its collected surveillance data 
every 72 hours, encrypt the storage mediums on which this data was stored for that 
period, and voluntarily agreed to commit to an annual audit [10]. 
 
To protect against unlawful personal intrusion, effective surveillance systems work to 
ensure that the impact from these systems are justifiable and the benefits of such system 
are clear, apparent and outweigh the drawbacks [10]. For example, automated teller 
machines, which record a user’s photograph at set intervals for the safety of customers 
and prevention of theft and fraud [11]. 
 
Therefore, to effectively show that crime will be impacted and reduced by a specific 
surveillance system, a study citing justifications is undertaken to find facts and benefits, 
conducted wherever the system is to be implemented. Of note is that such guidelines of 
justification, conformity and methods of collection or retention do not apply to covert 
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surveillance operations involving court-warranted investigations by law enforcement 
agencies. Yet, for all other systems, in sum, it must be shown that a reduction and 
prevention of crime, thereby also rendering it as an effective deterrent against criminal 
activity [10].  
 
Laws which apply specifically to user data have been enacted, amended and legislated 
within the Canadian Privacy Act and within the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). Amongst its complexities, these legislations make 
it specifically clear that law enforcement agencies have the right to query carriers for data 
when certain criteria have been realized, amongst these are, Section 7, 3.2 of the PIPEDA 
legislation states [12]: 
 
7. (3) (c.1) Made to a government institution or part of a government institution that has 
made a request for the information, identified its lawful authority to obtain the 
information and indicated that  
(i) It suspects that the information relates to national security, the defense of Canada or 
the conduct of international affairs,  
(ii) The disclosure is requested for the purpose of enforcing any law of Canada, a 
province or a foreign jurisdiction, carrying out an investigation relating to the 
enforcement of any such law or gathering intelligence for the purpose of enforcing any 
such law, or  




This section of the PIPEDA legislation makes it clear that law enforcement authorities 
who have obtained valid warrants are privy to communications and materials obtained 
through communications channels by request, and in this case carriers who facilitate the 
communications. 
 
Furthermore, current Canadian laws enable law enforcement to make requests to 
telecommunications carriers who are, by law, obliged to facilitate communications 
intercepts. In the United States of America, the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (CALEA), specifically details the exact obligations of carriers to build 
monitoring capabilities into their service architectures, for the purposes of lawful 
interception. This architecture is present in all forms of commercial communications 
architectures as it is required by law [12].  
 
Unfortunately, this type of facilitation is not yet available in Canada by way of 
legislation. Since monitoring capabilities are present within these systems, the Provincial 
and Federal Privacy Commissioners have set out a framework to minimize abuse of these 
capabilities. Privacy by design is a concept which underlines the most basic principles of 
data protection and broadly extends them to apply to technologies capable of 
surveillance, such as CCTV and telecommunications, voice, data or otherwise [10]. 
 
In the context of detecting and preventing electronic child pornography transmission, 
using the system detailed in this thesis, no personally identifiable data is collected or 
stored indefinitely, nor is it forwarded on to any systems which perform storage. Rather, 
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this system works by actively monitoring data packets for child pornography by 
processing data in real time and collecting statistics, once certain preset thresholds are 
achieved, the operator of the equipment may notify law enforcement of such activity, 
who may then seek valid warrants to perform further monitoring. They can also begin 
data collection, or identify the source and destination of the transmissions, and then take 
the necessary actions against the individuals or groups responsible for the illicit traffic. 
 
Our network-based approach occurs within two distinct stages to determine how exactly 
monitoring and alerting occurs. In Stage I, while the system actively monitors data, an 
obscenity score is calculated according to each connection, but, no personally identifying 
data is recorded. At Stage II of our system, if the threshold for the obscenity score is 
exceeded, the system will begin to record and store additional information about that 
particular connection, including IP address and packet size information.   
 
Privacy in mind, Association Xpertise Inc. has created a code that contains 10 principles 
of fair information practices, which form ground rules for the collection, use and 
disclosure of personal information [34]. 
The 10 principles are: 
 
1. Accountability: Who is in charge of audit, evaluation and investigation? 
2. Identifying purposes:  Why is this information collected? 
3. Consent: Upon whose authorization is this information being collected? 
4. Limiting collection: What is the minimum required amount of information collected? 
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5. Limiting use, disclosure, and retention: How will collected information be used, to 
whom will it be disclosed, and how long must it be retained?  
6. Accuracy: How accurate is this system? 
7. Safeguards: Has the collected information been secured? 
8. Openness: What is our personal information policy and practices? 
9. Individual access: What are the policies to access personal information?  
10. Challenging complaints: How do we investigate complaints?  
For our work we use these 10 principles as a basis of policy during the creation of a 
prototype that is capable of intercepting and classifying traffic as it passes though a 





Stage I (while monitoring) Stage II (upon triggered alarm) 
Accountability Limited accountability since no 
personal information is retained.  
The existing Privacy Officer for Law 
enforcement organizations will be 
accountable for any issues. 
Identifying 
Purposes 
To check for any illicit images 
being transferred across the 
network. 
To check for any illicit images being 
transferred across the network. Record 
the source and destination addresses of 
suspected traffic for further 
investigation. 
Consent The consent of the user is not 
required since no information is 
recorded. 
The consent of the user is not required 
since law enforcement may have 
obtained a warrant at this stage. 
Limiting 
Collection 
No information is recorded; the 
system stores the obscenity score. 
Only suspicious IP addresses and packet 
size information is stored. 
Use, 
disclosure, 
No information is recorded. Information is collected only for 
suspicious IP addresses and only law 
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retention enforcement agencies have access to it. 
Accuracy The accuracy of our system will be determined after the implementation of 
the system in a real network setup. 
Safeguards There would not be any 
information to safeguard. 
Any information collected or stored is 
kept with law enforcement agencies 
using existing safeguards. 
Openness Under no circumstances does our 
system collect any personal 
information. 
Source and destination IP of suspected 
traffic will be recorded. 
Individual 
Access 
Individual requests must conform 
to current Access to Information 
guidelines. 
Individual requests must conform to 
current Access to Information 
guidelines. 
Complaints Complaints against this system will 
be handled by the ISP. 
Compliance factors are judged by the 
corresponding law enforcement 
agencies as well as a government 
privacy watchdog group. 
 
Table 1-3:  PIPEDA principles and personal response 
 
1.4 Prototype Design 
The system is composed of two main parts – a host-based component and network-based 
component. In the network-based component, we have a packet level system which 
classifies images passing through the network using Linear Classifiers as is detailed in 
section 3.5. The network-based component has the advantage of working with both 
compressed and uncompressed images.  For the host-based component, we have an image 
matching system that is capable of searching for images that are already black-listed. The 
feature vectors of the black-listed images are calculated using the RGB colour space (see 
sec.3.6). Our system has been tested using the MLE and SLWE algorithms independently 
and these have not been tested to work in unison. 
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Figure 1-5 depicts a general architecture of the two approaches in relation to our image 
matching and classification system.  
 







Detection and prevention of electronically transmitted illicit pornography involves 
complex technical measures in relation to still images and moving video. Some notable 
works which are promising have been conducted and others are still being experimented 
with. Of these works, none offers a total solution as of yet, however, cannot be 
discounted as they are certainly a crucial element to the overall solution. 
 
2.1  Image Recognition 
Image Recognition software has been under intensive development for over three decades 
and is used in many industries to assist users with the tedious task of identifying images 
when a specific criterion is presented. 
 
A widely used method of image recognition termed as Content-Based Image Retrieval 
(CBIR), operates by analyzing the colour and geometry of images. This approach uses 
fundamental visual properties including background, texture, and shape. The information 
is then used to produce queried results based on the skin content of a picture that are 
above a certain threshold [13]. 
 
CBIR greatly reduces the time needed to process images. As an example of this, the 
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) algorithm uses features of image intensity, attained to 
extract ordinal descriptors of the image to construct an index for faster responses [14]. 
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Although much research has been done in the area of CBIR, little progress has been made 
to fully implement an engine solely based on the search of image content. Most CBIR 
systems are deficient in fully incorporating low level features of images, such as 
intensity, colour, texture, shape and spatial constraints characteristics, with the high level 
features such as semantic content.  
 
Hove et al. [31] proposed a CBIR system to deal with this issue that uses a shape 
thesaurus, instead of text thesaurus, to link the low level features extracted with 
semantics. Compared with text thesaurus, shape thesaurus can inject more features into 
CBIR related techniques. Thus, the system offers better efficiency by combining shape 
information with the text thesaurus.  
 
Feng et al. [32] also proposed the chain code as a principle method to represent shape 
descriptors. In this way, new definitions can be deducted from existing ones. The reason 
that the chain code is used to create the shape thesaurus is that it is simple to use the 
compared descriptors with other methods, such as Fourier Shape Descriptors (FSD) and 
Moment Invariants (MI). We use FSD, MI, Finite Element method (FEM), Turning 
Function and Wavelet Descriptor to obtain image shape to compare with other images’ 
shape thesaurus. 
 
Che-Jen et al. [29] proposed a digital feature retrieval mechanism for JPEG image files. 
The scheme extracts JPEG byte stream data at a packet level and it uses its Direct Current 
(DC) coefficients to search for suspicious files. Different DCT coefficients adopt a 
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variable length of codes as baseline JPEG files use Variable Length Codeword (VLC) 
encoding. Each Minimum Coded Unit is accountable for extraction of Y, Cb, Cr in a 
sequential manner. End of Block (EOB) values allow extraction of the DC components of 
the next block. Extracted DC components from JPEG packets with the same feature 
database are used for comparisons. The problem with this approach is that the system is 
prone to attacks such as scaling, transformation, cropping, lightening, darkening, noise 
corruption and network transition issues like packet loss, on JPEG files. 
 
Whitehead et al. [30] implemented a method of classifying Internet objects using 
descriptor coefficients, such as name coefficient, text coefficient, image coefficient, audio 
coefficient, video coefficient, plug-in coefficient, and relational coefficient. The image 
data is analyzed to determine whether it contains adult content inside an Internet object 
using predefined skin tone ranges in Hue-Saturation-Value (HSV) colour space.  
 
Forsyth et al. [42] reported that human skin has hue values between 0 to 25 (of a 
maximum 180) and saturation values between 50 and 230 (of a maximum 255). David 
used a statistical analysis of data settings to further refine the ranges, as optimal 
parameters. Skin tone defined as any pixel with Hue values between 2 to 18 (of a 
maximum 180) and saturation values between 80 and 230 (of a maximum 255). 
Statistical analysis of data settings can be used again to refine the ranges. 
 
The system divides the number of skin tone pixels within skin tone range in the Internet 
object image by the total number of pixels in the image and compares the resulting value 
against an automatically generated or user-defined threshold value. Those images 
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resulting with a ratio less than the threshold proportion of skin pixels are discarded. 
Images that are equivalent or greater than the threshold proportion of skin pixels are then 
assigned a nudity coefficient which is equal to the percentage of skin pixels in the image. 
Factors like the size of the image and encoding type are used to weigh the nudity 
coefficient of each image in an object.     
 
Similarly, the WebGaurd [41] system intends to automatically detect and filter adult 
content from the Internet. WebGuard uses a crawler based system to extract relevant data, 
combines textual and image content, and the URL name of a site to construct a feature 
vector. To improve performance, an analysis using a skin colour pixel mode is used. 
 
2.2  Currently Available Products 
A large selection of products designed by companies to reduce the flow of illicit material 
into homes and businesses are available and affordable to the average consumer. They 
may be application or hardware-based and can vary greatly in their function and 
effectiveness. In particular, 95% of schools, 43% of public libraries and 33% of parents 
in the United States employ some variant of filtering technology to block content deemed 
inappropriate such as pornography [15]. 
 
Of these products, they are normally classified into two main categories, host-based, or 
proxy-based. These two categories are further divided by their specific method of 
operation into two distinct forms, static and dynamic filtering, which maybe used 
individually by a product, or can be used in conjunction. 
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2.3  Dynamic and Static Filtering 
Dynamic filtering is a proactive method of restricting content based on predetermined 
variables such as written content and website address. This type of filtering uses a more 
complex method of restricting access to inappropriate materials than static filtering 
provides. It uses a complex dictionary-based analysis of text to determine if the content is 
suitable or unsuitable for viewing. 
 
Static filtering uses a predetermined blacklist method by blocking content using specific 
keywords within web pages or their addresses, of which can also be blocked separately 
(example – Cleanfeed, NetNanny®). 
 
2.4  Host-based and Proxy-based Filters 
Host-based filtering allows users to install an application which merges with the 
operating system itself to provide protection, or install software which merges with a 
Primary Internet access application, such as a web browser. Examples of this type of 
filtering from commercially available products include NetNanny® [16] and Cyber 
Patrol® [17]. 
 
Proxy-based filtering is usually employed in businesses to block inappropriate content 
and websites. This blocking mechanism can be used within a server relay used by 
employee workstations to provide internal Internet access. Workstations connect through 
this server which filters websites previously blacklisted by addresses or keywords and 
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restricts access to these sites and their content. Generally, because of load considerations, 
this particular type of filtering uses a static method. 
 
2.5  Network Approaches 
Existing products and concepts concerning packet classification have been researched 
and developed, and analysis of their effectiveness is currently available. Most of these 
systems perform operations by analyzing packet header data, and are focused towards 
intrusion detection and prevention systems, or quality of service (QoS) features.  
 
For QoS applications, routers have taken the task of admission control, weighted 
queuing, and resource scheduling. These mechanisms work by distinguishing packets, 
with data types extracted from headers, and making processing decisions based on preset 
rules. Gupta [18] summarizes certain  solutions using packet classification based on a 
criteria applied to the packet header using basic search algorithms (for example: Linear 
Search, Caching, Hierarchical Tries, Set-Pruning Tries), and geometric algorithms (for 
example: Grid-of-Tries, Area-based Quad-trees, Fat Inverted Segment Tree), and 
heuristic algorithms (for example: Recursive Flow Classification, Hierarchical Cuttings, 
Tuple-Space search), and hardware-specific search algorithms (for example: Ternary 
Content Addressable Memories, Bitmap-Intersection), with each of these algorithms 
applied on the IP header of a packet. 
 
Feldman et al. [19] proposed the Fat Inverted Segment (FIS) tree based algorithm for 
implementing multi-field range based classification, with a limitation to the nature of FIS 
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trees having to conform to classification searches multiple times in order to successfully 
traverse a FIS tree. 
 
Wang et al. [20] also mentions another approach intended for QoS consisting of a disjoint 
based algorithm for a multi-field range based packet classification. This algorithm uses a 
new data structure of disjointed graphing sets composed of multiple Elementary Interval 
Trees, and Disjoint Interval Trees, representing a given set of rules, where only a single 
path of traversal is required during packet classification searches. 
 
Warkhede et al. [21] has taken a different approach to the previously mentioned ones, and 
presents a multi-dimensional encoding factor, focused upon spacing comprised of the 
source and destination IP address, source and destination port and protocol type. This 
type of encoding style by dividing rules, set into several multi-dimensional collision-free 
rule sets, which are adopted to create new coding vectors known as Layer Coding 
Vectors. Therefore, in regards to efficiency and resource usage, tests conclude that these 
methods increase efficiency and reduce resource requirements. 
 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) require packet-level multi-match 
classification, whereby each packet must be checked against all rules. Ternary Content 
Addressable Memory (TCAM) has been adopted to solve multi-match classification 
issues because of their abilities to perform fast parallel matching. Yet, TCAM based 
approaches are notable, since the very nature of CAMs require a full search of stored 
words spanning the entire available addressable range, as opposed to Random Accessible 
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Memory (RAM), which obtains memory addressing information from the operating 
system itself. TCAMs are adopted to solve multi-match classification issues, but are 
subject to large power consumption and resource costs. Because of fast parallel matching 
advantages, TCAMs are primarily used within solid-state computing devices, such as 
routers [22]. 
 
For NIDS systems, software-based schemes of performing classification are noted.  To 
resolve general CAM inefficiencies, Yu et al. [23] proposes a novel scheme that 
overcomes these CAM related issues by using a new Set-Splitting Algorithm (SSA). The 
design of SSA allows it to split filters into multiple groups and performs separate TCAM 
lookups into these groups. Packet-level approaches such as NIDS require the usage of 
multi-matched classification, whereby matching filters are reported. It works to guarantee 
the removal of at least half the intersections when a filter set is split into two different 
sets, resulting in lower TCAM memory and resource usage [23]. 
 
Thus far, the previously described classification methods of QoS and Network Intrusion 
Detection Systems use IP packet headers to classify packets, and few attempt to 
determine content based on actual payload, with the exception of certain Deep Packet 
Inspection systems and limited Network Intrusion Detection Systems. 
 
Wang et al. [24] proposes such a Network Intrusion Detection System which uses the 
payload of the packet itself, and processes it within an anomaly detector. Its efficiency is 
of note as well as the automated and unsupervised manner in which it operates. Profiling 
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of byte frequency distribution and the standard deviation of the application payload, 
flowing to a single host and port, is provided during the training stages. When performing 
classification, the Mahalanobis Distance calculation is used for the detection of 
similarities between new data and the pre-computed profile, then compares this 
calculation against a measured threshold and generates an action when the distance of the 
new input exceeds that of the defined threshold. 
 
Each of these methods works to meet the definitions and expectations for their intended 
usage and many work well enough to accomplish their specific tasks. The specified 
detection of image or video content in a granular method within a packet, and its rapid 
analysis and profile computation, are difficult to accomplish in a network-based 
approach.  None of these approaches provide an integral solution; however they all 
represent genuine efforts towards the eradication of obscene material. 
 
Of these, one proposal uses Stochastic Weak Estimation coupled with linear classifiers as 
another payload inspection method, and this approach aims to derive linear classifications 
using statistical identifiers of IP packets [25-27]. During the training stages, pre-labeled 
IP packets are input sequentially from symbols drawn from an alphabet, and taught to 
learn these statistics using a Stochastic Weak Estimator. This also takes into account the 
variability of the distribution source. The classification rule, once it is derived, is then 
tested to analyze its performance, and this validation is undertaken by enabling a testing 
set with pre-labeled IP packets into their linear classification rules, and then recording the 
accuracy of the classification data. This is done n times with an x amount of testing sets 
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derived from partitioning the entire data set, in a process of cross validation. When 
classifying packets from the data set, the Stochastic Weak Estimator is also used to 
extract the relevant features of the inputted classification rules. After this, the linear 
classification rule labels each byte of the packet with preset criteria, such as pornography 
or otherwise, and the entire packet is deemed as pornography if the majority of its bytes 
are labeled as such. 
 
2.6  Hardware Devices 
Hardware-based appliances dedicated to securing perimeter networks typically make use 
of URL and keyword filtering at the TCP/IP Layer 3. These types of devices, though 
usually more expensive than software solutions, are designed to provide efficient and 
uninterrupted traffic processing under maximum loads, and can accommodate the most 
complex keyword and URL filtering requirements [28]. 
 
Though these solutions are effective for traditional blockage of restricted content, each 
has very severe drawbacks and safety mechanisms which can be easily subverted. Host-
based filtering can be circumvented by simply uninstalling the software, or by installing 
and loading a different operating system on the same system. Proxy-based solutions can 
be circumvented by using another proxy, or determining addresses for edge routing 
devices to connect through to an external network. And finally, hardware-based filtering 
is easily overcome by gaining knowledge of websites which do not use expected wording 





DESIGN AND PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The system is composed of three major blocks – image packet interception, image 
decoding and image classification. For packet interception, we used Netfilter (see sec. 
3.1), a subsystem in Linux 2.4. Our system uses Netfilter for packet classification 
because of its open-source framework, its efficiency. It also provides a high level of 
programmability which features well defined functions that allow advanced parameters 
for packet interception. 
 
Shown in Figure 3-1 and 3-2 are the diagrammatic representations of the overall system – 
the first is for a compressed data stream (byte stream) and the latter for decoded RGB 
colour space images (see sec. 3.2 for JPEG image coding and decoding). For our system, 
we adapted a JPEG-based decoder due to a very large portion of Internet images being 
comprised of the JPEG file format. The input to the system is the Internet traffic which 
consists of packets. As each packet is captured by the system the image filters are 
engaged and processes the packets that contain images (see sec. 3.3). The image packets 
are then passed through the binary JPEG image assembler which constructively adds the 
data in each packet to form the binary sequence for an image. This binary sequence is 
then sent into the JPEG decoder which converts the binary sequence to its RGB 
components. The feature extractor extracts information based on two algorithms (see sec. 
3.4), the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) and the Stochastic Learning Weak 
Estimator (SLWE). The obtained features are then compared against two feature vectors, 
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Figure 3- 2: Block diagram of proposed method for RGB colour space data. 
 
Figure 3-3 illustrates the process of classification where feature vector one and feature 
vector two are obtained from the training stage, and for any image which passes thorough 
our system, we calculate its feature vector.  The distance, 𝑑1, is a distance between the 
test image’s feature vector and nude images, and 𝑑2 is the distance between the test 
image feature vector and feature vector of non-nude images.  The end result is the 
classification of the image being illicit or non-illicit. Each module of the system is 




Figure 3- 3: Classification process of proposed method 
 
To accomplish image classification at the network layer, traffic capture was required. 
Network analysis was done using Netfilter to capture each packet transiting the network. 
Section 3.1 below provides a detailed explanation. 
 
3.1 Netfilter 
The Netfilter module is used to intercept and capture packets. Netfilter is a subsystem in 
the Linux 2.4 kernel which facilitates packet filtering, network address translation (NAT) 
and connection tracking, possible through the use of hooks in the kernel network code. 
Hooks are defined as places in the kernel code (either statistically built or in the form of a 
loadable module) that can register functions to be called for specific network events. As a 
packet moves through the Linux Kernel network stack, it passes through several hook 
locations where these packets can be analyzed and kept or discarded. More information 
on Netfilter can be found in [39].  
 
The Linux kernel starts with three lists of rules in the filter table which are called chains 
or firewall chains. These three chains are INPUT, OUTPUT and FORWARD. A chain is 
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a checklist of rules and if a rule does not match the packet, then the next rule in the chain 
is referenced and executed. The kernel looks at the chain guidelines to make a decision if 
there are no more rules to consult. In general the guideline tells the kernel to DROP the 
packet. Figure 3-4 illustrates the Netfilter chain operation and Figure 3-5 details the hook 








Figure 3- 4: Netfilter chains: INPUT, OUTPUT and FORWARD. (Slightly modified 
version: original version from Netfilter.org Project [39]) 
 
An explanation of Netfilter mechanisms: 
1. Routing: The kernel first looks at the destination of the packet on its arrival.  
2. If the destination matches the box it is routed downward to the INPUT chain.  
3. If forwarding is disabled or if the kernel does not know how to forward the packet 
it will drop it. 
4. A packet is routed to a FORWARD chain if it is destined for another network 
interface. 
5. A program running on the box can also send network packets through the 















Figure 3- 5:  Netfilter architecture showing points where hook can be inserted. 
(Slightly modified version: original version from Netfilter.org Project [39]) 
 
Netfilter defines five hooks for the IPv4 protocol. Listed below, in Table 3-1, the five 
possible hooks and their functions are described further. 
Hook Meaning 
NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING Observe all valid incoming packets 
NF_IP_LOCAL_IN Observe packets destined for this IP address. 
NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT Observe locally generated packets. 
NF_IP_FORWARD Observe packets being forwarded through the machine. 
NF_IP_POST_ROUTING Observe IP packets immediately before be transmitted. 
 
Table 3-1: Netfilter hooks and their meaning 
 
Our system makes use of the NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING hook, which is the first hook once 
the packet is received. Once the hook function has processed the packet, it must be 
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returned to with one of the predefined Netfilter codes. These codes and their definitions 
are listed in table 3-2. 
 
TARGET MEANING 
NF_ACCEPT Accept this packet. Terminating Valid in the filter table 
NF_DROP Ignore this packet. The sender gets no notification. Terminating Valid in the 
filter table 
NF_STOLEN Netfilter to "forget" about the packet. What this tells Netfilter is that the 
hook function will take processing of this packet from here and that Netfilter 
should drop all processing of it. This does not mean, however, that resources 
for the packet are released. The packet and its respective sk_buff structure 
are still valid, it's just that the hook function has taken ownership of the 
packet away from Netfilter 
NF_QUEUE Queue packet for user space. Packets can be further processed at the user 
space and sent back into network stack. 
NF_REPEAT Call this hook function again 
 
Table 3-2: Netfilter targets and their use 
 
3.2  Image Coding, Decoding 
There are many different image format types used on the Internet such as JPEG, BMP, 
and TIFF images. The most popular and widely used image type is JPEG. For our 
implementation we only consider JPEG images and this section deals with the encoding 
and decoding of that format. As the system deals with the conversion of the binary 
sequence to a JPEG image, this section deals more with the process of decoding a binary 
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bit stream rather than the encoding of it. However, one must note that the decoding 
process is just the reverse process of the encoding process. The complete guideline on 
image coding and decoding can be found in [37-38, 43-45]. 
 
3.2.1  JPEG Encoding    
The JPEG encoding process is performed on blocks of an image that are 8 pixel wide by 
8 pixels high.  Each of these JPEG data blocks is encoded in a sequence of three 
operations.  First the image block is transformed using a 2-dimensional Forward Discrete 
Cosine Transform (FDCT) to determine the spectral components of the image.  After the 
FDCT is performed the upper left corner of the coefficient matrix contains the DC 
component of the block and the lower right corner contains the highest frequency 
components of the image.  Since the human eye does not readily perceive high frequency 
changes the high frequency components can be stored with less precision than the more 
important low frequency components.  This low pass filtering of the image is performed 
by the next stage, which quantizes the data in exactly this manner.  The Quantization 
table used in this step determines the exact filter characteristics and thus the compression 
ratio and quality of the encoded JPEG image.  Finally the Coding stage transforms the 
8×8 quantized block into a linear stream of values and then assigns the more frequently 
occurring values to shorter binary codes and less frequently occurring values to longer 
binary codes to minimize the length of the encoded message.  The Coding table used in 
this step determines the compression ratio since the table must accurately match the 
relative frequencies of the input values to achieve good compression.  FDCT and the 
Inverse Discrete Cosine Transform IDCT are defined as: 
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  and  vuS vu ,,  is the FDCT value of the block matrix entry 
(𝑢, 𝑣) ,  yxs yx ,,  is the IDCT of the block matrix row 𝑥 and column  𝑦. These equations 
can also be further rewritten in the form of linear transformations using matrices as 
follows: 
𝑆 = 𝐷 ∙ 𝑠 ∙ 𝐷𝑇  
𝑠 = 𝐷𝑇 ∙ 𝑆 ∙ 𝐷 
Where 𝐷 is a constant 8×8 matrix formed by the cosine values and constants above.  The 
JPEG decoder used this linear transformation equation to compute the IDCT since 
computing the product of two matrices is relatively straight forward and less time 
consuming. 
 
3.2.2  JPEG Decoding 
Part of our experiment was to try to classify images using RGB colour space and 
compressed binary images. Every image packet was extracted and decoded to get its 
RGB components. Thus, this section is our main concern, since any extracted image from 
our network has to be reconstructed, partially, or in full, so that it can be processed by the 
classifier. The JPEG data in packet form is entered into a network buffer which is 




The JPEG decoding process is an inverse transformation where the encoded data is first 
decoded and restored to 8×8 pixel data blocks using a preliminary Decoding stage. The 
main blocks of JPEG decoding include Run-Length Decoding (VLD), Zig-Zag scan and 
Huffman Decoding (ZZ/HD), quantization (DQ) and IDCT. In the quantization stage, 
quantization table specification is used to approximately regain the spectral components 
of the image block, while low frequency components may be fully restored the high 
frequency components may be severely distorted however this distortion is barely 
perceptible.  Finally the Inverse Discrete Cosine Transform approximately recovers the 













Figure 3- 6: Block diagram of JPEG decoding (Slightly modified version: original version 
from Stuijk [45]) 
 
The compressed JPEG image data forms a byte stream input for the decoder. This byte 
stream contains two-byte combination markers which identifies a structural part of the 
compressed image data. The first byte is always 0x'FF'. The second byte is defined in the 
JPEG standard (see Appendix A). This byte indicates which of the structural parts of the 
compressed image data follows the marker in the byte stream.  
 
An image can be separated in a number of colour components. This results in a set of 
grayscale images describing the tone of the colours in the image. When an image is, for 
instance, separated into its red, green and blue components, you obtain three grayscale 
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images describing the red, blue and green tones in the image. Every grayscale image 
describing a tone can be divided into smaller parts using a grid of 8 × 8 pixels.  
 
The JPEG standard describes the syntax for the flow of the compressed image data. The 
syntax for flow of this compressed image data in a baseline JPEG decoder is given in 
Figure 3-7. 
 
A valid JPEG compressed image data stream always starts with a start of image [SOI] 
marker. After the SOI marker a number of different markers may be found. These 
identify for instance, quantization or Huffman tables that are needed for the decoding. 
After getting zero or more of these tables, a start of frame marker [SOF] may be found. 
After the SOF marker, these tables can also be defined. After zero or more of these 
tables, a start of scan [SOS] marker must be found. After the SOS, we find a number of 
entropy coded segments [ECS] in the compressed image data stream. These ECS contain 
the coded values for all pixels that comprise the image. These pixel values are grouped in 
so called minimal coded units [MCU].  
 
Depending on the horizontal and vertical sampling factors of every colour component, it 
may be necessary to take one or more blocks of that component into a MCU. The 
maximum number of blocks in a MCU is however limited by the standard to at most ten. 
If the entropy-coded segment does not contain the last MCU of the image, then a restart 
marker [RST] is found after the entropy-coded segment in the compressed image data. 
After this restart marker, another entropy-coded segment starts. This process is repeated 
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until all entropy-coded segments are processed by the decoder. Then another scan may be 
found in the compressed image data, or the compressed image data ends with an end of 












i = 0 to last - 1
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Abbreviated format for table-specification data
 























3.3  Image extraction 
Our assumption is that every packet which passes through our system does so through a 
gateway on which our system is implemented as shown in Figure 3-9. Our system then 
processes traffic by differentiating various classes of packets, such as image, or non-
image packets. To accomplish this, the majority of images are fragmented into smaller 
pieces as per the Maximum Transmission Unit of most TCP/IP networks. To reconstruct 
these images in preparation for analysis, the system has three buffers that are successively 
used to store images as they transit the network. For our system, three buffers are 
sufficient to accommodate network traffic. To extract only image packets from overall 
network data, SOI markers are used to identify image packets, which are then placed into 
an available buffer. This is accomplished by filling a buffer once an SOI is detected, then 







Figure 3- 9:  Possible realization of our network; our system is implemented on the 




TCP sequence numbers are used to extract the remaining image data until an EOI marker 
is found within our payload. When the buffer is full, the payload is copied to the JPEG 
decoder and the TCP headers are processed for further analysis if needed. Algorithm 4.1 
shown below details the process of extracting image packets. In a byte stream method, 
the entire contents of the buffer data are directly passed onto the classification module. In 
RGB colour space transfers, buffer data is sent onto a JPEG decoder for decoding, and 
once decoded the output is the RGB colour space. 
Algorithm 3.1: imageExtract(packet) 
1. *1 set buf = NULL 
2. *2 set buf_start_filling = False 
3. set payload = extractPayload(packet) 
4. set size =size( payload) 
5. If payload[0] = SOI 
4.1 set buf = payload  
4.2 set buf_start_filling = True  
6. If buf_start_filling = True and packet_in_sequence 
      6.1 append (buf, payload) 
7. If payload[size-1] = EOI 
      7.1 append (buf, payload) 
      7.2 extract_image(buf) 









3.4  Training 
The purpose of the training stage is to extract feature vectors of two supervised classes:  
nude and non-nude images. This is done using the spectral characteristics and the byte 
streams of JPEG images. This training is accomplished using a Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator and a Stochastic Learning Weak Estimator. Figure 3-10 shows the process of 
feature extraction of the RGB colour space data in the training stage. Note that MLE and 










Figure 3- 10:  Image feature extraction using MLE/SLWE estimators for RGB colour 
space 
 
3.4.1  Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is one of the most popular statistical methods 
used for fitting a mathematical model to some data. The idea behind maximum likelihood 
parameter estimation is to determine the parameters that maximize the probability 
(likelihood) of the sample data. 
 
MLE offers a way of tuning the free parameters of the real world model to provide a 
good fit. Loosely speaking, the likelihood of a set of data is the probability of obtaining 
that particular set of data, given the chosen probability distribution model. For our work 
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we used 256 symbols for every components of our colour space and also 256 symbols for 
byte stream. 
  
The specific figure of 256 symbols was chosen because for any byte stream or RGB 
colour space data, the range is defined from 0 to 255. The RGB colour components are 
defined from 0 to 255 and the possible values for byte stream data is also 0 to 255, since 
we have 8-bits in one byte.  
 
For the byte stream we want to estimate 𝑆 =  [𝑠0, 𝑠1,… , 𝑠255 ] and 𝑠𝑖  calculated as: 
𝑠𝑖 =  𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑖 / 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠, 
Where  𝑠𝑖
255
𝑖=0 = 1. 
 
For our colour space samples, we have 256 colour realizations (symbols) of every 
component. Thus we want to estimate the outcome of each symbol for each colour 
component, namely red, green and blue. Therefore 𝑆 =  {𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝐺 , 𝑆𝐵} and 𝑆𝑅 =
 𝑠𝑅0, 𝑠𝑅1,… , 𝑠𝑅255 , 𝑆𝐺 =  𝑠𝐺0, 𝑠𝐺1 ,… , 𝑠𝐺255  , and 𝑆𝐵 = [𝑠𝐵0, 𝑠𝐵1,… , 𝑠𝐵255 ] 
𝑠𝐶𝑖 =  
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙 𝑖 𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑙𝑠
 
and 𝑠𝐶𝑖  is the feature vector entry of symbol 𝑖 in one of the colour components, 𝐶 =






Algorithm 3.2: 𝑴𝑳𝑬(𝑰𝒎𝒂𝒈𝒆,𝒓𝒐𝒘, 𝒄𝒐𝒍) 
1. 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊 =  𝟎 𝒕𝒐 𝟐𝟓𝟓  
1.1 set 𝑽[𝒊] = 𝟎 
2. 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊 =  𝟎 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒐𝒘 ∗ 𝒄𝒐𝒍 
2.1 𝒔𝒆t 𝑽[𝑰𝒎𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒊 ]  =  𝑽[𝑰𝒎𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒊 ] + 𝟏 
3. for 𝒊 =  𝟎 𝒕𝒐 𝟐𝟓𝟓  





3.4.2  Stochastic Learning Weak Estimator 
The Stochastic Learning Weak Estimator, or SLWE, was proposed by Ommen et al. [46] 
as a replacement for the MLE algorithm’s deficiencies. In particular, its proficiency in 
quickly capturing changes in the source of distribution for a particular set of data.   
SLWE was developed using stochastic learning. For each estimate performed, each 
instant is updated, based on the values of the current sample. This updating occurs by 
using a multiplication rule. 
 
Let 𝑋 be a binomially distributed random variable, which takes on the value of either “1” 
or “2”. We assume that 𝑋 obeys the distribution S, where 𝑆 =  [𝑠1, 𝑠2]
T
. In other words, 
𝑋  = “1” with probability s1 
    = “2” with probability s2, 
where, 𝑠1  +  𝑠2  =  1. 
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Let 𝑥(𝑛) be a concrete realization of X at time “n”, then S can be estimated by 
maintaining a running estimate of 𝑃(𝑛)  =  [𝑝1(𝑛),𝑝2(𝑛)]
T 
of S, where 𝑝𝑖(𝑛) is the 
estimate of 𝑠𝑖  at time “n”, for 𝑖 = 1, 2. The value of 𝑝1(𝑛) is updated as per the following 
simple rule: 
𝑝1 𝑛 + 1 =   
        𝜆𝑝1 𝑛 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 𝑛 = 2
1 − 𝜆𝑝1 𝑛 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 𝑛 = 1
  
Where 𝜆 is user-defined parameter 0 < 𝜆 < 1 and  
𝑝2 𝑛 + 1 = 1 − 𝑝1 𝑛 + 1  
Let 𝑋 be a multinomial distributed random variable, which takes on the values from the 
set {“1” , . . . , “ r” }. We assume that 𝑋 is governed by the distribution 
𝑆 =  [𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠𝑟  ]
T
 as follows: 




Now, in our model we let 𝑥(𝑛) be a concrete realization of X at time “𝑛”, where 𝑋 =
 {0,… ,255}. The main aim is to estimate S, i.e., 𝑠𝑖  for 𝑖 =  0 , . . . , 255 . We achieve this 
by maintaining a running estimate 𝑃(𝑛) = [𝑝0(𝑛), . . ., 𝑝255 (𝑛)]
T
 of S, where 𝑝𝑖(𝑛) is 
the estimate of 𝑠𝑖  at time “𝑛”, for 𝑖 =  1, . . .  , 𝑟. Then, the value of 𝑝𝑖(𝑛) is updated as 
per the following simple rule:  
𝑉𝑖 𝑛 + 1 =  
𝑉𝑖 +  1 − 𝜆  𝑉𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
, 𝑥 𝑛 = 𝑖
𝜆𝑉𝑖 , 𝑥[𝑛] ≠ 𝑖
  
where 𝑖 =  0, . . . ,256 and 𝜆 is training constant. [25 and 47] reported that the value of 𝜆 




Further more [46] show that when 𝑛 → ∞ 
𝐸[𝑉𝑖(∞)]  =  𝑠𝑖  
Thus,  𝑉𝑖  𝑛 ≈ 1
255
𝑖=0 . 
The feature vector for the three colour components are calculated in the same manner as 
mentioned above. Each colour component of the image is transformed into a one 
dimensional array. Algorithm 3.3 describes the process of calculating the feature vector 







𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ is converted into a one dimensional array. 
Algorithm 3.4: 𝑺𝑳𝑾𝑬_𝒔𝒖𝒎(𝑽,𝒏,𝝀) 
1. set 𝒔𝒖𝒎 =  𝟎 
2. for 𝒊 =  𝟎 𝒕𝒐 𝟐𝟓𝟓 
2.1 set 𝒔𝒖𝒎 =  𝒔𝒖𝒎 + 𝑽[𝒊] 
3. set 𝒔𝒖𝒎 =  𝒔𝒖𝒎 –  𝑽[𝒏] 
4. set 𝒔𝒖𝒎 =  𝑽[𝒏]  +  (𝟏 − 𝝀) ∗ 𝒔𝒖𝒎 
 
Algorithm 3.3: 𝑺𝑳𝑾𝑬(𝑰𝒎𝒂𝒈𝒆 ∗, 𝒓𝒐𝒘, 𝒄𝒐𝒍,𝝀) 
1. for 𝒊 =  𝟎 𝒕𝒐 𝒏  
1.1 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝑽[𝒊] =  𝟏 ⁄ 𝟐𝟓𝟔 
2. for 𝒊 =  𝟎 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒐𝒘 ∗ 𝒄𝒐𝒍 
2.1 set 𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑 =  𝑺𝑳𝑬𝑾_𝒔𝒖𝒎(𝑽, 𝑰𝒎𝒂𝒈𝒆[𝒊],𝝀) 
2.2 for 𝒋 = 𝟎 𝒕𝒐 𝟐𝟓𝟓 
2.2.1 set 𝑽[𝒋]  =  𝝀 ∗ 𝑽[𝒋] 
2.3 set 𝑽[𝑰𝒎𝒂𝒈𝒆[𝒊]] = 𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑 
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3.5  Classification Distances 
Statistical distance measure, defined as the distances between two probability 
distributions is used in many research areas in pattern recognition, information theory, 
and communication. It captures correlations or variations between attributes of the feature 
vectors and provides bounds for probability of retrieval error of a two way classification 
problem. 
 
Among all statistical distance classification functions, we chose and tested the three most 
widely-used in pattern recognition and three others that showed excellent performance in 
[34-36]. This list includes the Euclidean distance (ED), the Weighted Euclidian distance 
(WED) and Non-negative Similarity Coefficient-based distance (NVSC). Figure 3-11 














ED / WED / VD / CD /
CosD / NVSC 
Feature Vectors
Class 1 and 2
 




3.5.1  Euclidian Distance 
In practice, for a simple pattern recognition problem, Euclidian distance (ED) is 
considered the simplest way to quickly measure the dissimilarity between two histograms 
at a low computational cost. For feature vectors with 256 symbols 𝑉 =  (𝑣0,… , 𝑣255 )  
and 𝑉’ =  (𝑣0
′ ,… , 𝑣255
′ ), the ED between these vectors can be calculated as: 





The problem with ED is that the relationship between the entries of feature vectors is 
discarded, and as a result, it does not reflect the true distance between feature vectors  𝑉 
and 𝑉’. 
 
Algorithm 3.5: 𝑬𝑫 (𝑽,𝑽’) 
1. set 𝒅 =  𝟎 
2. for 𝒊 =  𝟎 𝒕𝒐 𝟐𝟓𝟓 
2.1 set 𝒅 =  𝒅 +  (𝑽[𝒊] − 𝑽’[𝒊])2 
3. set 𝒅 =   𝒅 
 
3.5.2  Weighted Euclidian Distance 
Weighted Euclidian Distance (WED) is based on correlations between feature vectors by 
which different patterns can be identified and analyzed. It is a useful way of classifying 
unknown sample sets into known sample sets. It differs from Euclidean distance in that it 
takes into account the correlations of the data set and is scale-invariant, i.e. not dependent 
on the scale of measurements. WED between two vectors can be calculated as: 
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Where 𝜎𝑖  is the standard deviation of 𝑣𝑖  over the training set, and defined as: 
𝜎𝑖 =   
1
𝑁




Where 𝑉 𝑖  is the mean of 𝑉𝑖 , and defined as: 







Algorithm 3.6: 𝑾𝑬𝑫 (𝑽,𝑽’) 
1. set 𝒅 =  𝟎 
2. for 𝒊 =  𝟎 𝒕𝒐 𝟐𝟓𝟓 
2.2 set 𝒅 =  𝒅 +  (𝑽[𝒊] − 𝑽’[𝒊] )2/𝒗𝒂𝒓(𝒗𝒊) 
3. set 𝒅 =   𝒅 
 
3.5.3  Variational Distance 
For feature vectors with 256 symbols 𝑉 =  (𝑣0,… , 𝑣255 )  and 𝑉’ =  (𝑣0
′ ,… , 𝑣255
′ ), the 
Variational Distance (VD) between these vectors can be calculated as: 









Algorithm 3.7: 𝑽𝑫 (𝑽,𝑽’) 
1. set 𝒅 =  𝟎 
2. for 𝒊 =  𝟎 𝒕𝒐 𝟐𝟓𝟓 
2.3 set 𝒅 =  𝒅 +  𝒂𝒃𝒔(𝑽[𝒊] − 𝑽’[𝒊]) 
3. set 𝒅 =   𝒅 
 
3.5.4  Counter Distance 
Counter distance is another simple distance measure designed to calculate the distance as 
follows: 
𝑑1 = # 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑕 𝑡𝑕𝑎𝑡 
 𝑣1𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖
′   <  𝑣2𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖
′    
𝑑2 = # 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑕 𝑡𝑕𝑎𝑡 
 𝑣1𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖
′   ≥  𝑣2𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖
′    
 
Algorithm 3.8: 𝑪𝑫 (𝑽𝟏,𝑽𝟐,𝑽’) 
1. set  𝒅𝟏 =  𝟎 
2. set 𝒅𝟐 =  𝟎 
3. for 𝒊 =  𝟎 𝒕𝒐 𝟐𝟓𝟓 
3.1 if 𝒂𝒃𝒔(𝑽𝟏[𝒊] − 𝑽’[𝒊])  < 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑉𝟏[𝒊] − 𝑽’[𝒊]) 
 3.1.1  𝒔𝒆t 𝒅𝟏 =  𝒅𝟏 + 𝟏 
3.2  else 




3.5.5  Cosine Distance 
Cosine Distance (CosD) is also another similarity measure that is very similar to ED in 
higher dimensional spaces [34].  Qian [35] reported that among all the conventional 
distance measures like ED, the cosine distance achieved the best result in facial 
recognition tests and was ranked as one of the best 3 measures out of 17 different 
distance measures. CosD between two vectors can be calculated as: 












Algorithm 3.9: 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝑫 (𝑽,𝑽’) 
1. set 𝒅 =  𝟎 
2. set 𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟏 =  𝟎 
3. set 𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟐 =  𝟎 
4. for 𝒊 =  𝟎 𝒕𝒐 𝟐𝟓𝟓 
4.1 set 𝒅 =  𝒅 + 𝑽[𝒊] ∗ 𝑽’[𝒊] 
4.2 set 𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟏 =  𝑽[𝒊]2 
4.3 set 𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟐 =  𝑽’[𝒊]2 
5. set 𝒅 =  𝟏–  𝒅 ⁄   𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟏 ∗  𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟐  
 
3.5.6  Non-negative Vector Similarity Coefficient-based Distance 
Non-negative vector similarity coefficient-based (NVSC) distance is our last distance 
measure which originated from the theory of multivariate clustering analysis, but has 
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showed satisfactory results in face recognition [36]. NVSC is derived from a similarity 
coefficient specifically for non-negative vectors and defined as: 
𝑑 𝑉,𝑉 ′ =  
 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖
′)255𝑖=0




Algorithm 3.9: 𝑵𝑽𝑺𝑪 (𝑽,𝑽’) 
1. set 𝒅 =  𝟎 
2. set 𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟏 =  𝟎 
3. set 𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟐 =  𝟎 
4. for 𝒊 =  𝟎 𝒕𝒐 𝟐𝟓𝟓 
4.1 set 𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟏 = 𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟏 +   𝒎𝒊𝒏(𝑽[𝒊],𝑽’[𝒊]) 
4.2 set 𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟐 = 𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟐 +   𝒎𝒂𝒙(𝑽[𝒊],𝑽’[𝒊]) 
5. set 𝒅 = 𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟏/𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑𝟐  
 
3.6 Image Matching 
Image matching is another useful host-based application of our approach that is applied 
to match black-listed images in the network. This system does not rely upon previously 
encountered imaging data and it can be applied against images which have been 
manipulated.  This eliminates the weakness exhibited by most hash-based matching 
algorithms which rely upon consistent data for accuracy. Hash-algorithms are prone to 
failure when any changes in a given image (even one pixel) are presented, thus resulting 
in a mismatch. Illicit images on the internet are often times stored and displayed as 




To perform the image matching process, feature vectors of target images are extracted 
and stored in a database using MLE or SLWE. Every image passing through the system is 
first calculated by its feature vector using MLE or SLWE, depending on which database 
is used, then, it is compared against a database as illustrated in Figure 3-12. If the 
distance is within a given threshold then a result of a match is recorded. If the threshold is 
not reached, the result is recorded as a non-match. Our experiments show that the 
threshold rates for accurate matching occur at 0.0025 for ED and 0.34 for VD. The image 
matching system is described in Algorithm 3.10. 
 
 










Algorithm 3.10: 𝑰𝒎𝒂𝒈𝒆𝑴𝒂𝒕𝒄𝒉(𝑰𝒎𝒂𝒈𝒆,𝒓𝒐𝒘, 𝒄𝒐𝒍 ,∗ 𝑽) 
1. set 𝑽’ = 𝑴𝑳𝑬𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓(𝑰𝒎𝒂𝒈𝒆,𝒓𝒐𝒘, 𝒄𝒐𝒍) 
2. for 𝒊 =  𝟏 𝒕𝒐 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓_𝒐𝒇_𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒔 
2.1       set 𝒅 = ∗ 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒓(𝑽,𝑽’)  
2.2       if 𝒅 <= ∗ 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒄𝒉𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 then match found 
∗ 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑟 could be any of the distance measures(ED, WED, VD, CD, CosD, NVSC) 
∗ 𝑉is feature vectors of black-listed images, and 𝑉[𝑖] is feature vector for image 𝑖. 





RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The experiments for this thesis work were conducted with three host computers and a 
router. The three hosts were connected to a Linux-based (Fedora Core 6) system where 
each host exchanged data passing through the Linux server (router). The Linux router 
used in this experiment was executed on an Intel x-86 based Pentium 4 CPU, with a clock 
frequency of 2.4GHz. The hosts for the experiment were comprised of three physically 
separate systems with Intel x-86 based Pentium 4 processors.  
 
The experimental image database was comprised of a total of 3000 random non-child 
pornography images from the Internet. Most of the test images were sampled from 
Google images, Yahoo! images and some custom made images. Our experiment was 
divided into three categories: image classification, image matching and network 







Figure 4- 1: Experimental setup 
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4.1  Image Classification 
Image classification is an important part of digital image analysis. This classification 
stage is divided into two stages – training and classification, and is done for both 
compressed binary data and RGB data.  A further explanation is detailed in the upcoming 
sections.  
 
4.1. 1 Training Stage 
All images used in our experiments were legal. No actual child pornography images were 
ever collected, seen, sought, or used. 
 
Pre-classified images were separated into two categories, nude and non-nude. For each 
category of images, we preselected 150 images of either fully nude content, or, no nudity 
content, with an average size of 640×480 pixels, (~75kB).  
 
Two methods of training were utilized for our work. The first method was training by 
using a compressed byte stream. In the second method of training, the system was trained 
with an RGB colour space in total, and then each RGB colour component was 
individually trained. For the RGB colour space and compressed byte stream training, the 
feature vectors of individual components were extracted using MLE and SLWE 




4.1. 2 Classification Stage 
Every image that flowed through our network was intercepted and tested for its content. 
For the first stage of our testing, the feature vector for intercepted images was calculated 
from the compressed byte stream data and compared with feature vectors of nude and 
non-nude image vectors derived from the training stage. Table 4-1 shows that the success 
rate for byte stream data.  Classification distance algorithm, VD, was optimal for both 
MLE and SLWE algorithms. Also, we observed that the success rate for NVSC was not 




Success Rate (%) 
ED WED VD CD CosD NVSC 
MLE  63.6 65.4 68.3 61.7 66.5 67.9 
SLWE 67.5 66.3 69.4 60.3 64.3 69.1 
 
Table 4-1: Success rate for nude images using JPEG byte stream data 
 
Image classification for RGB colour space is done by using a “height” scan and a 
“radius” scan (see Figure 4-2) with a combination of RGB components or by using 
individual Red, Green or Blue components.  
 
Height scan and radius scans serve two primary reasons for their use. Firstly, since most 
images which enter our network are fragmented according to the MTU, usually 1500 
bytes, the accuracy of our system may be determined from analysis of only a portion of 
the image. Secondly, it was observed that system performance will increase if features 
which are determined to have no effect on image analysis are removed.  
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The height scan and radius scan method work by beginning with a full image scan while 
noting accuracy, and then gradually reducing the processed image areas to 20%. This was 
then tested with 3000 images for classification using six distance measures algorithms as 
explained in Chapter 3. Half of these tested images were part of the nude content 
category, with sizes similar to images used in the training stage. For RGB colour space 
each image was processed using a height scan and radius scan method.  
(a) Height scan (a) Radius scan
 
Figure 4- 2: Height and radius scan methods 
 
Figure 4-3 shows the success rate of the MLE engine when the height scan method was 
used for images with nude content. CosD, NVSC and WED yielded better results 
compared to the CD, VD and ED algorithms. Results from this test also indicate that 
CosD, NVSC and WED algorithms perform similarly when processing 50% of the image 




Figure 4- 3:  Success rate for nude images using height scan (MLE). 
 
Also, it was observed that the optimal percentage to scan was 65-80% of the area of the 
test image, as most of the characteristic features of these images are located within the 
top 65-80% of the image for height scan (c.f shadow area at Figure 4-3). 
   
This result is more accurate for images processed with the radius scan method. Figure 4-4 
below shows success percentages increasing to as much as 75% when the radius scan 
method was used with images containing nudity.  Also, it was observed that the optimal 




































Figure 4- 4:  Success rate for nude images using radius scan (MLE). 
 
 
Figure 4- 5: Error rate using height scan; all test images are non-nude (MLE). 
 
Figure 4-5 shows that the system falsely identified non-nude images as nude images in 
the MLE engine when the height scan method was used. CosD and NVSC demonstrated 
better results as compared to the WED, CD, VD and ED algorithms.  These false 



























































Also, Figure 4.6 shows results from the radius scan method which provided comparable 
results to the height scan method, with a minor decrease in error percentage rate. 
 
 
Figure 4- 6: Error rate using radius scan; all test images are non-nude (MLE). 
 
Figure 4-7 & 4-8 show that the success rate of the SLWE algorithm yield better results 
with the VD algorithm. Moreover, the radius scan method still provided better 





























Figure 4- 7: Success rate for nude images using height scan (SLWE). 
 
 
Figure 4- 8: Success rate for nude images using radius scan (SLWE). 
 
Overall, the SLWE algorithm improved the system performance by ~2 – 4%.  Other 
important observation was that when the individual colour components were compared, 

































































individual colour components accuracy test results.   Tables 4-2 and 4-3 illustrate overall 
performance of MLE and SLWE algorithms when using height and radius scan. 
Algorithm Best Worst Observation 
MLE NVSC with 73.5 % 
success rate  
CD with 55.8 % 
success rate 
Similar results are observed 
when considering only the B 
component of RGB colour 
space. 
SLWE WED with 76.4 success 
rate  
CD with 64.3 % 
success rate  
NVSC and CosD have similar 
best result 
 
Table 4-2: Best/worst performance for MLE and SLWE algorithms (Height scan, when 
considering 70-80% the image) 
 
Algorithm Best Worst Observation 
MLE NVSC with 76 % 
success rate  
ED with 60.8 % 
success rate 
Similar results are observed 
when considering only the B 
component of RGB colour 
space. 
SLWE WED with 77% success 
rate  
CD with 66.3 % 
success rate  
NVSC and CosD have similar 
best result 
 
Table 4-3: Best/worst performance for MLE and SLWE algorithms (Radius scan, when 
considering 70-80% the image) 
 
4.2  Image Matching 
For matching, the image database was composed of feature vectors of 20 different images 
randomly taken which included nude, semi-nude and non-nude. An initial pool of 20 
images were altered from their originals in size, texture and with various random effects, 
creating a total of 55 images exactly related to the original 20 in content. 
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We also added 200 extra images to our test data. We found that the system identified 
95% of those images in the database and there were no false positives. The system was 
unable to identify the other 5% of the images as black listed images. In the future, a 
further refined threshold can help reduce the number of errors in the system. Figure 4-9 
shows, on the left, sample images in the database and, on the right, the images matched 
with the database.  The first image set (A) modified images to a variety of sizes. The 
second image set (B) was resized and shaded. The third image set (C) was modified in 
colour and resized. The fourth image set (D) was tested with a combination of blur and 
















4.3  Network Performance 
Using Wireshark [40] in capture mode, network performance was measured while the 
first 100 images were transferred between host A and host B. A time measurement was 
performed between filtered and unfiltered processing to determine the amount of 
overhead generated by filtering.  
 
This filter was enabled in various modes such as byte stream filter mode using MLE and 
SLWE, RGB filtering modes for both MLE and SLWE and for one colour component, 
also using MLE and SLWE. 
 
As a result of these experiments, tests showed the best timings were achieved using byte 
stream with MLE. 11% to 17% of overhead occurred when using ED and WED, 
respectively. Using SLWE for byte stream, results as high as 80% to as low as 58% 
occurred. Figure 4-10 and 4-11 show the byte stream processing times and the overhead 
as a percentage for MLE and SLWE. Refer to Appendix B for more network performance 
test results. 




Figure 4- 10:  Processing times of 100 images when byte stream used; black line shows 
processing time without filter enabled.   
 
 





























































CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Detection and prevention of electronically transmitted illicit pornography involves 
complex technical measures in relation to still images and moving video. No approach 
thus far has generated a truly accurate system to fully mitigate the electronic transmission 
of child pornography. However, this thesis is an important milestone in the ongoing effort 
to effectively produce a total solution within the privacy framework in effect in Canada. 
All images used in our experiments were legal. No actual child pornography images were 
ever collected, seen, sought, used or considered. 
 
5.1  Summary and Conclusions 
The electronic transmission of child pornography remains a large problem and this 
research is imperative in its solution. Our approach utilized a SLWE algorithm coupled 
with a Linear Classifier and also used a MLE coupled with a linear classifier. Of these 
two methods, it was determined through our experimentations that various methods 
proved more accurate and efficient than others, but were dependent on the exact method 
they were to be used. For example, our experiments showed that the SLWE coupled with 
the NVSC distance algorithm was highly accurate for the RGB colour spaces of images. 
This method proved to adversely affect network performance with its extra overhead and 
may be deemed unsuitable for network layer approaches. For byte stream image data, 
MLE and VD algorithms proved the best in network layer performance with the lowest 
overhead, but accuracy was 4 to 5 percent lower than the SLWE coupled with the NVSC 
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distance algorithm method. MLE coupled with and NVSC distance algorithm showed 
nearly the same results.  
 
Network performance for this research was a very important issue. Any large amounts of 
overhead introduced on the network would render this system unusable in any practical 
application. Algorithms which showed promising results in terms of accuracy and success 
or error rates, such as SLWE coupled with linear classifiers such as WED, ND, and 
NVSC, are unlikely to be used in network-based implementations, as the imposed 
overhead is much higher. SLWE is roughly 3 to 4 times higher in network overhead than 
MLE. The SLWE algorithm takes 255 steps more than that of MLE to update its feature 
vectors in every step although MLE and SLWE algorithms have the computational 
complexity of 𝑂(𝑛), where 𝑛 is the size of the image. 
 
When a comparison is made between the data types used for training and classification 
the RGB colour space had more favorable performance than that of byte stream by as 
much as 7 percent. Moreover it was observed that similar results were obtained if only 
one colour component is used thereby decreasing the processing times by factor of 3. 
 
It was also observed that when scanning 75 to 80 percent of a given test image using the 
radius scan method, a better result was achieved. This was determined to occur since 
extra processing time was avoided since 10 to 15 percent of surrounding areas within 




A system with little overhead is required for the efficient operation of our application at 
the network layer. To accomplish this, MLE coupled with variational distance using a 
compressed byte stream was determined to be the best choice for the classification of 
illicit images at the network layer. Advantages of this method are that only 12 percent of 
overhead is generated with an average of 71% success rate when classifying images at the 
network layer in real-time. If time based performance is a non-issue, then SLWE coupled 
with NVSC or WED would provide a 76% success rate.  
 
Furthermore, our system was disadvantaged since every image was classified, even when 
images obtained from certain known sources could have easily and efficiently been 
checked against a blacklist first. This could occur using a text-based method of analyzing 
image meta-data, URL information, keywords or filenames. The system described in our 
thesis would have proved more efficient if those text-based scanning methods were used 
first, and then, our system would be triggered to scan further in the event that text-based 
methods passed inspection. 
 
5.2  Recommendations and Future Work 
The primary purpose of network layer image classification is to classify images with high 
success rates and minimal overhead. To satisfy both constraints is a difficult challenge, 
yet, it may be possible to develop a system with higher success rates and lower overhead 




A noticeable quality of our system remains the decision making functionality which 
allows nude or non-nude detection. There were multiple instances of images with great 
distance divides between both feature vectors and yet the system still identified the 
images as nude. To resolve this issue, an experiment may be conducted to improve 
thresholds for those image distances well above a defined limit. An additional class with 
three class labels instead of two (neither nude or non-nude, nude, and non-nude) would 
help to decrease error rates.  
 
A particular recommendation is to use Che-Jen’s et al. [29] approach, which uses a digital 
feature retrieval mechanism for JPEG-based images using only the DC coefficients of the 
image. Our system could be trained using DC coefficients, and it extracts the JPEG 
binary data at the network layer for classification. Instead of decoding the entire byte 
stream, it uses JPEG image markers to extract only the DC values and then applies them 
to the classification algorithm. This method should work to considerably minimize the 
time required to classify a given set of images. 
 
For proceeding with research in this field, a system should be first created using a text-
based method to scan and analyze real-time data traffic form blacklisted URLs, image 
meta-data, filenames and keywords. Should the results of the scan prove positive, the 
image classification system should not be engaged. If the results of this scan do not show 
any conclusive results, then the image classification system should be engaged for further 




Another approach is to use a statistical method to estimate the number of illicit images in 
a sample set of data traffic. This feature should trigger the image classification system in 
a randomly distributed time interval over an increasing amount of time to statistically 
estimate ratio of illicit images to non-illicit images for the current data traffic. This would 
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Appendix A:  
Appendix A-1: Standard JPEG image markers. (Table courtesy of 
http://www.impulseadventure.com/) 
Hex Marker Marker Name Description 
0x FFC0  SOF0 Start of Frame 0 Baseline DCT  
0x FFC1  SOF1 Start of Frame 1  Extended Sequential DCT  
0x FFC2  SOF2 Start of Frame 2  Progressive DCT  
0x FFC3 SOF3 Start of Frame 3  Lossless (sequential)  
0x FFC4  DHT Define Huffman Table   N/A  
0x FFC5 SOF5 Start of Frame 5  Differential sequential DCT  
0x FFC6 SOF6 Start of Frame 6  Differential progressive DCT  
0x FFC7 SOF7 Start of Frame 7  Differential lossless (sequential)  
0x FFC8  JPG JPEG Extensions   N/A  
0x FFC9  SOF9 Start of Frame 9  
Extended sequential DCT, 
Arithmetic coding  
0x FFCA SOF10 Start of Frame 10  
Progressive DCT, Arithmetic 
coding  
0x FFCB SOF11 Start of Frame 11  
Lossless (sequential), 
Arithmetic coding  
0x FFCC DAC Define Arithmetic Coding    
0x FFCD SOF13 Start of Frame 13  
Differential sequential DCT, 
Arithmetic coding  
0x FFCE SOF14 Start of Frame 14  
Differential progressive DCT, 
Arithmetic coding  
0x FFCF  SOF15 Start of Frame 15  
Differential lossless 
(sequential), Arithmetic coding  
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0x FFD0  RST0 Restart Marker 0 N/A  
0x FFD1  RST1 Restart Marker 1   N/A  
0x FFD2 RST2 Restart Marker 2   N/A  
0x FFD3 RST3 Restart Marker 3   N/A  
0x FFD4 RST4 Restart Marker 4   N/A  
0x FFD5 RST5 Restart Marker 5  N/A   
0x FFD6 RST6 Restart Marker 6   N/A  
0x FFD7 RST7 Restart Marker 7  N/A  
0x FFD8 SOI Start of Image  N/A   
0x FFD9 EOI End of Image   N/A  
0x FFDA  SOS Start of Scan  N/A   
0x FFDB  DQT Define Quantization Table   N/A  
0x FFDD  DRI Define Restart Interval  N/A   
0x FFE0  APP0 Application Segment 0 
JFIF - JFIF JPEG image  
AVI1 - Motion JPEG (MJPG)  
0x FFE1  APP1 Application Segment 1 
EXIF Metadata, TIFF IFD format, 
JPEG Thumbnail (160x120)  




JPEG Extension 7  
JPEG-LS 




JPEG Extension 8  
JPEG-LS Extension  
Lossless JPEG Extension 
Parameters  
0x FFFE  COM Comment N/A   
0x FFFF  Stuff Stuff Byte  





Appendix B: Processing times and overhead. 
Appendix B- 1:  Processing time when considering all colour components of the RGB 
colour space per 100 images, black line shows processing time without filter enabled.   
 
 
Appendix B- 2: Percent overhead when considering all colour components of the RGB 























































Appendix B- 3: Processing times of 100 images when only the B colour component; 
black line shows processing time without filter enabled.   
 
 

































































Appendix C: Success and error rates 
Appendix C- 1: Error rate using height scan; all test images are non-nude (SLWE using 
RGB colour space) 
 
 
Appendix C- 2: Error rate using radius scan; all test images are non-nude (SLWE using 






















































Appendix C- 3: Success rate using height scan; all test images are nude (MLE using only 
the B component of RGB colour space). 
 
 
Appendix C- 4: Success rate using radius scan; all test images are nude (MLE using only 



































































Appendix C- 5: Error rate using height scan; all test images are non-nude (MLE using 
only the B component of RGB colour space). 
 
 
Appendix C- 6: Error rate using radius scan; all test images are non-nude (MLE using 






















































Appendix C- 7: Success rate using height scan; all test images are nude (SLWE using 
only the B component of RGB colour space). 
 
 
Appendix C- 8: Success rate using radius scan; all test images are nude (SLWE using 



































































Appendix C- 9: Error rate using height scan; all test images are non-nude (SLWE using 
only the B component of RGB colour space). 
 
 
Appendix C- 10: Error rate using radius scan; all test images are non-nude (SLWE using 
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